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Background: To investigate organisational factors influencing the implementation challenges of redesigning
services for people with long term conditions in three locations in England, using remote care (telehealth and
telecare).
Methods: Case-studies of three sites forming the UK Department of Health’s Whole Systems Demonstrator (WSD)
Programme. Qualitative research techniques were used to obtain data from various sources, including
semi-structured interviews, observation of meetings over the course programme and prior to its launch, and
document review. Participants were managers and practitioners involved in the implementation of remote care
services.
Results: The implementation of remote care was nested within a large pragmatic cluster randomised controlled
trial (RCT), which formed a core element of the WSD programme. To produce robust benefits evidence, many
aspect of the trial design could not be easily adapted to local circumstances. While remote care was successfully
rolled-out, wider implementation lessons and levels of organisational learning across the sites were hindered by the
requirements of the RCT.
Conclusions: The implementation of a complex innovation such as remote care requires it to organically evolve, be
responsive and adaptable to the local health and social care system, driven by support from front-line staff and
management. This need for evolution was not always aligned with the imperative to gather robust benefits
evidence. This tension needs to be resolved if government ambitions for the evidence-based scaling-up of remote
care are to be realised.
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Ethnographic methodsBackground
The need for new models of integrated care that can re-
duce the costs of keeping people out of care homes and
hospitals is an imperative for heath and social care sys-
tems around the world. The use of ‘remote care’ tech-
nologies (telecare and telehealth) as integral to new
models of care is seen by the UK government as one po-
tential solution [1]. Since the mid 2000s, a number of* Correspondence: j.hendy@surrey.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orprogrammes have been launched in the UK to stimulate
the adoption of remote care, including in the Depart-
ment of Health’s Whole System Demonstrator (WSD)
programme. The WSD had two main goals. The demon-
stration aspect refers to delivering a model that results
in more integrated working practices across the NHS
(health care) and Local Authorities (social care) at or-
ganisational and routine service delivery levels, supplant-
ing traditional models of care through increased use of
telehealth and telecare services. The second goal was to
test the wide scale impact of telehealth (the remote ex-
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existing long-term condition i.e. COPD, diabetes, heart
failure), and telecare, (the remote, automatic monitoring
of an individuals’ personal health and safety, i.e. mobility,
and home environment). At the start of the WSD
programme, although there was some evidence for the
clinical and cost effectiveness of telehealth and telecare
[2-4], the evidence base was not so rigorous that wide-
scale national adoption has been achieved [5,6]. Com-
bined implementation and evaluation of remote care is
complex, with the ease of the task and the success
achieved often overestimated [5,7]. Despite the Govern-
ment promoting the concept [6,8], many seemingly suc-
cessful telehealth and telecare projects fade away [9,10].
The idea of using remote care as a driver of whole-
system working and integration has been seen politically
as attractive [1], with this concept largely treated as ‘self-
evident and readily available for operational use’ [11]. In
reality the term a ‘whole system’ approach is used ubi-
quitously and tends to be a non-specific policy goal, with
what it means, and how it could be achieved left am-
biguous [11,12]. In this instance it has been used to de-
note telecare as part of a joined-up health and social
care system. By commissioning this work the UK De-
partment of Health wanted to move away from remote
care merely as a ‘good idea’, by providing future policy
makers with formal and definitive ‘proof ’ that this tech-
nology worked [8], underpinned by a normative expect-
ation that only the outcomes of a large and robust
randomised controlled trial (RCT) would do. The overall
WSD evaluation was therefore nested within, reportedly,
the world’s largest RCT of remote care technologies to
date [13]. Findings from WSD are now becoming avail-
able as they go through peer review [14,15]. The papers
focus on (1) clinical outcomes and patient reported out-
comes, (2) changes in service use and economic impacts,
(3) service users and carers experiences, and (4) the or-
ganisational, supply chain, and service delivery implica-
tions for scaling-up. Whilst an RCT may provide a
suitable vehicle for demonstrating the impact of clinical
and cost effectiveness, determining the ‘success’ of policy
concepts such as ‘whole system’ change is more challen-
ging [8,11,12]. Currently, we have varying degrees of
knowledge about the impact of innovative technologies
on different aspects of the health and social care system
[7,9] but require knowledge about how these elements
recursively interact to achieve whole system integration
and change [16]. To investigate this question we drew
on a body of work that explores the task of evaluating
services making the transition from clinical trials to
more mainstream normalized services [5,6,8,12,17], and
also embedded our approach within a wider body of lit-
erature on socio-technical change in complex organisa-
tional settings [18-20]. This body of work emphasises aconstructionist ontology and interpretative epistemology
in which the constituent parts of a system cannot be
understood objectively, or in isolation, but need to be
situated in dynamic relation to how different stake-
holders ‘make-sense’ of the context and system around
them [7,8,20,21].
Research objectives
We were tasked with conducting an organisational
evaluation, in parallel with service delivery implementa-
tion and an RCT. Our aim was to better understand the
interconnections that exist between policy, organisa-
tional environments, contextual influences (e.g. history
of remote care involvement at each site) and the
programme intervention itself. In particular, we were
interested in understanding the interaction of organisa-
tional factors that would assist in the successful large
scale implementation of remote care. Essentially, we
explored the context, mechanisms, and outcome rela-
tionships between different stakeholders across the sys-
tem, by asking ‘what makes sense and works, for whom,
and under what conditions’ [21]. A fundamental chal-
lenge for the sites was the anticipated tensions between
differing organisational priorities: (1) to maintain an ef-
fective intervention at a high level of quality and create
robust scientific evidence about the technologies in use
and (2) to establish practices and systems in place that
could foster sustainable use of the technologies in the
future; nationwide, beyond the WSD programme.
Methods
We conducted an in-depth, comparative, longitudinal
analysis of the implementation of telehealth and telecare
within the three sites, focusing both on processes and
outcomes. The case study method is particularly useful
where the range of issues is wide, the concepts are
related to each other in complex ways [22] and context
is important [23].
Case study sites
Each WSD site was chosen by the Department of Health
in 2006 through a competitive process because (a) they
were considered the most likely to succeed in scaling up
remote care as part of a whole system redesign and (b)
they were considered representative of the range of local
health and social care systems in the UK. Each site is a
region of England (Cornwall, Kent, London Borough of
Newham) comprising one or two (Kent) health author-
ities (i.e. Primary Care Trusts) and geographically super-
imposed Local Authorities, with responsibility for social
care. Each of the three sites has its own particular char-
acteristics and population health needs and demands.
Newham has a multi-ethnic community with high levels
of economic, social and educational deprivation. Kent
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varying levels of economic and social development.
Cornwall is predominantly rural, a large, sparsely popu-
lated area with a large elderly population and poor trans-
port links. The sites began work in 2008, to develop care
models based around the introduction of new telecare
and telehealth services. Implementation was nested
within a large pragmatic cluster-randomised controlled
trial (RCT). Pragmatic RCTs are more flexible to adjust
to real life conditions, and useful when the both the con-
text and the intervention itself (telecare and telehealth)
are complex [24]. The trial was developed with two par-
allel treatment arms to assess the effectiveness of tele-
health and telecare on healthcare utilisation/ costs and
cost-effectiveness relative to standard care over a 12-
month period [13]. All study sites had exactly the same
type of patients enrolled in the trial, and received the
same interventions. This was a stringent condition of
the protocol. Each site had a local WSD Project Team
with responsibility for implementing the trials in their
region in line with the protocols provided by the WSD
Evaluation Team. The WSD Project Teams’ responsibil-
ities included: identifying and recruiting eligible partici-
pants; installing and maintaining telehealth or telecare
devices for intervention participants; training partici-
pants (and professionals) in the use of the telehealth and
telecare; providing monitoring centre services; providing
usual health and social care to all participants; providing
local organisational and management resources as
required to support the trial. The WSD Project Teams
comprised of existing staff from the local Primary Care
Trust (Cornwall), Social Services (Kent) or a combin-
ation of both (Newham). All WSD Project Teams were
supported by frontline clinical and technical staff. Imple-
mentation was supported across local sites by involve-
ment of the voluntary sector, the private sector and
expert patient and carer groups, who advised on the
types of technology employed, helped to source patients,
and advised on patient information needs. An external
management consultancy appointed by the Department
of Health provided additional programme support. For a
detailed outline of the trial methods see Bower et al [13].
By attending early evaluation team meetings, we
observed that taking part in the trial was perceived by
the organisations as an exciting opportunity, that the
trial would provide them with the financial and manage-
ment support (Department of Health funding and a
team of specialist management consultants) they needed
to deploy telehealth, in particular, on a large scale. Bid-
ding to be part of the WSD programme had been rigor-
ous, and the site teams felt privileged to be given the
opportunity to develop new services that would not
otherwise have been afforded. However, once the trial
got underway excitement was tempered by the level ofwork involved in developing new services and using
technology standardised within the context of an RCT,
and by the effort of ensuring that large numbers of trial
participants were recruited within a relatively short
timeframe (see below).
Data collected
Qualitative, ethnographic data was collected across the
sites between June 2008 and July 2011 (see Table 1). Each
site had a dedicated management team charged with roll-
ing out the programme, recruiting staff and reviewing
progress. They also facilitated and co-ordinated installa-
tion of the technology, and oversaw recruitment, assess-
ment and monitoring of patients in the trial. We
purposively sampled and interviewed everyone in each
site within their management teams, as well as other staff
strategically involved in implementation. No-one we
approached refused to participate in our study. Saturation
of the findings was reached approximately half way
through each of our three phases of data collection (each
data collection phase represented a different stage of the
programme), with the same themes re-emerging across
different groups. The emphasis in the interviews was on
key decisions taken by local health and social care stake-
holders involved in the WSD programme, and their im-
pact on implementation outcomes. Interviews covered
the role of strategic policy, operational decisions and tar-
gets, and relationships between the organisations and dif-
ferent professional groups within the care system. We
explored the impact of the WSD programme on local im-
plementation practices, and on closing the traditional cul-
tural and practice gap between health and social care.
Over the trial period we conducted 115 interviews, trian-
gulated with 92 strategic documents and 174 hours of
ethnographic observations (see Table 1). Before data col-
lection began the study was approved by Liverpool Re-
search Ethics Committee (ref: 08/H1005/4). The data
presented is part of much larger body of work currently
being written up by the authors.
Data analysis
Our organisational analysis drew on recent innovation
research [18,20,25] and normalisation process theory
[19]. In paying attention and situating the findings
within the dynamic complexity of the system, we mainly
drew on the work of Greenhalgh and colleagues [20,21]
and earlier work on the implementation of remote care
and healthcare ICT [26-28]. When examining the so-
cially constructed meanings of different stakeholders, we
found the sensemaking work of Weick useful [29]. Data
was analysed in three stages. Our analytic process drew
on the structured and systematic approach of coding
and theme abstraction [30]. To ensure reliability, two
members of our team independently read interview
Table 1 Data collection June 2008 - July 2011
Study timetable Interviews conducted Observations (on site and
strategic meetings)
Document review
Pre-trial phase: Planning and early
implementation July – Oct. 2008
5 LA managers 11 x 3 hr local site management
meetings
14 meeting notes
1 NHS manager 2 x 3 hr strategic WSD team board
meetings
1 WSD evaluation proposal
8 other associated staff 1 ministerial document
1 x 4 hr national remote care expert
network meeting
3 presentations regarding remote care
progress and initiatives in the UK
Total: 14 43 hours 19 documents
Phase I: Participant recruitment
and clinical engagement
14 LA managers 10 x 3 hr local site management
meetings
17 meeting notes
14 NHS managers 5 x 3 hr strategic WSD team board
meetings
3 site project management documents,
1 Newham telecare care model overview,
1 Newham telecare procedures and
1 Newham telehealth response interim
care pathway documents
Nov. 2008 – Mar. 2008 3 joint LA & NHS
managers
4 x 4 hr national remote care
expert network meetings
12 presentations about remote care
progress and initiatives in the UK
Total: 31 57 hours 35 documents
Phase II: Delayed delivery group
joins the trial and the focus shifts
to evaluation Sept. 2009 - Oct. 2010
14 LA managers 10 x 3 hr local site management
meetings
20 meeting notes
14 NHS managers 3 x 3 hr strategic WSD board
meetings
1 telehealth pilot report
15 presentations about remote care
progress and initiatives in the UK1 joint LA & NHS manager 5 x 4 hr national remote care
expert network meetings,
1 x 6 hr conference and 1 x 3hr launch
of Kent telehealth pilot event
Total: 29 68 hours 36 documents
Phase III: Business continuity plans
and early mainstreaming days
April – July 2011
10 LA managers 2 x 3hr local site management
meetings
2 meeting notes
14 NHS managers
17 other associated staff
Total: 41 6 hours 2 documents
Overall total: 115 interviews 174 hours of observations 92 documents
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ability of our interpretation of the data was further
established by drawing on additional data collected from
the informal interviews, through observations and from
project documentation (see Table 2).
Results
By the end of the WSD programme telehealth and tele-
care had been rolled out across all three sites, with 2,281
participants in the intervention group and 2,949 in the
control group (see Table 2).
Whole system redesign
In the original WSD research protocol, three types of
participants were to be recruited: those assessed as eli-
gible for telecare, those assessed for telehealth, and a
mixed group assessed as eligible for both [13]. However,early on in the trial it became clear that there were not
the numbers expected, hence recruitment of participants
with mixed care needs proved difficult. Some site man-
agers attributed this to population demographics, but
the majority of the staff believed that this group failed to
be identified and recruited due to the strict RCT recruit-
ment conditions. Whatever the reason, a lack of recruit-
ment meant this group was not included as a separate
category in the trial. This decision had far-reaching stra-
tegic consequences for the sites and their overall goal of
demonstrating the advantages of whole system redesign
and of providing implementation lessons for scaling-up.
Health care and social care staff no longer needed to
work together to deliver care for this mixed group. Sub-
sequently, telecare and telehealth no longer acted as a
combined driver for the redesign of care services, and
for developing new levels of integration, because the two
Table 2 Study site characteristics
Sites Cornwall Kent Newham Overall Total
WSD Organisational lead Cornwall Primary Care Trust Kent County Council London Borough of Newham
Telecare users pre-trial <1000 c.2000 c.2500 5500
Telehealth users pre-trial 0 c.200 0 200
Trial telecare users
Intervention group 545 427 304 1276
Control group 492 462 370 1324
Total 1037 889 674 2600
Trial telehealth users
Intervention group 566 583 456 1605
Control group 625 595 405 1625
Total 1191 1178 861 3230
Overall numbers (telehealth/telecare) 2228 2067 1535 5830
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range of associated but separate processes.
I would describe it actually not as being a whole
system. . .because of the segregation between telehealth
and telecare. I think we’ve called it whole system and
it’s not. I think it is two separate systems that have the
potential of being the whole but. . . as part of the trial
there was no group which had both telehealth and
telecare equipment installed. . . It wasn’t a proper
evaluation strand. . .it should have been (senior
manager).
In addition, new systems for data sharing across health
and social care sectors failed to be developed, and the
need for new organisational processes and staff that
seamlessly spanned both sectors was also eliminated.
Alongside any strategic vision of integrated processes,
the organisational will to develop an integrated model
around new combined telecare and telehealth services
was dissipated. The lack of integration was not only due
to RCT selection criteria. There appeared to be a lack of
organisational readiness. Here readiness is defined as the
degree to which the cases involved were prepared to par-
ticipate and succeed in this endeavour [31,32]. We also
considered the extent to which the organisations and
individuals within it perceived the change as needed
[32,33]. As one clinician put it; ‘As an organisation, are
they ready to change completely the way they work? And
are there clinicians ready for that. . .I think we have
proved often that they aren’t.’ To take part in the
programme, sites hadto demonstrate “a history of suc-
cessful partnership working across health and social care,
e.g. joint health and social care teams which provide
comprehensive and integrated packages”, and show “evi-
dence of a clear plan for a whole system approach” [1].
However, the development of ‘whole system’ strategiesand activities that should have commenced at the start of
the programme was never pursued. Managers did not
elucidate nuanced understandings of ‘whole system’
working or redesign. Overall, they were unconcerned
about the specific goal of increased integration, which
was seen as largely unrealistic and secondary to the de-
velopment of expanded remote care services, seen as es-
sential for improving patient care. Despite, the pre-trial
conditions, we found that whole system working was not
a large part of the culture being enacted and driven by
staff. In practice, there was little evidence of integrated
services, or any move towards integration, with services
largely operating within traditional cultural, structural
and financial silos and sector boundaries.
A person in the NHS cannot create a care package in
social services even though they’ve been talking about
how to do it for the last five years and I can see why,
because the NHS doesn’t want. . . well the council
doesn’t want the NHS spending its budget. While you
can talk about philosophy as much as you like, until
there’s an integrated budget system, it’s never going to
work (healthcare professional).
The WSD programme may not have led to the ‘whole
system’ change, in terms of ‘truly integrated services’ and
a ‘radical and sustained shift in the way in which ser-
vices are delivered’, but engagement in the programme,
nevertheless, strengthened existing links between health
and social care. Improved communication due to the
work of rolling out telehealth services in particular, acted
as a catalyst for building relationships and for the joint
ownership of new care processes and goals. For example,
specialist community nurses responsible for telehealth
monitoring worked closely with social care staff to en-
sure the new services fitted within patient’s existing care
packages and that all members of the care team were
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together’ was seen as a significant challenge and an
important outcome in its own right, a rare ‘gem’
afforded by the dedicated work and funding attached to
the programme. Interviewees felt that implementing
the WSD programme helped to identify duplications in
the existing services provided, and enabled them to work
more closely around the needs of individual patients.
However, many of these positive changes appear attached
to the particular hard work of trying to get telehealth
implemented, within the WSD trial.
Implementation challenges in the context of an RCT
The pragmatic design of the RCT allowed for a degree of
flexibility, with local sites able to choose some criteria
for patient inclusion. Despite this flexibility, standardised
elements of trial, such as participant recruitment pro-
cesses, were perceived as problematic to local implemen-
tation processes. Local managers felt that the RCT
evaluation required a ‘one size fits all’ approach that
overrode local contextual differences in terms of popula-
tion needs and prior experiences. For example, the ma-
jority of WSD participant recruitment was conducted
via general practice lists, whereas previously local assess-
ments had been conducted by local staff who visited
patient’s homes, such as occupational therapists. Accord-
ing to one interviewee,
(We were) all about how you use telehealth and
telecare to improve health and social care for your
population, which had nothing to do with randomised
control trials. It caused massive damage in terms of
what we would have been doing, because we had to
stop doing what was obvious, which was helping those
people that benefit most, and alter the direction of
travel. . . Encouraging social services to refer their
clients that could benefit from this was destroyed by
the randomised control trial. . . So, it was very
destructive in a sense (senior manager).
Managers expressed the view that the sites needed to
deviate from previous ‘real-life’ models of assessment
and service delivery and create new trial-specific ones.
During this process, some existing relationships and
partnerships between stakeholders were damaged, and
organisational goodwill was lost. As reported in other
work [8] it was difficult for social and health care staff
to morally accept that due to the randomisation
requirements of the RCT, some people assessed as
needing a service had to wait before the equipment was
supplied:
We’re very restricted in relation to WSD and, in fact,
some of the people we referred to be included as partof WSD never got the kit . . . which leaves a bad taste
because they did fit the criteria (social care
professional).
Previous telehealth and telecare services in Kent and
Newham were led by local authority social services. To
try and maximise previous learning both sites decided to
keep this model. Partly with the aid of previous funding
[34] telecare has already been widely implemented
across the UK, and in two of the three demonstrator
sites. Previous telecare experience assisted with recruit-
ment but the fact that the sites could not use existing
users in the RCT reduced the recruitment pool, leading
to delays.
We had already stripped out of Newham all of those
people who could most benefit from telecare so they
are outside of the trial. . . Anybody that really thought
about where to actually do this would not choose
somebody that had already done telecare (middle
manager).
Another challenge was the perceived uneven focus of
the trial design, focusing separately on telecare and tele-
health, with the latter seen as the most innovative part
of the WSD trial. There was a strong sense that the RCT
was more focused on telehealth rather than telecare
interventions.
Telehealth had a far greater exposure and it’s definite
that the focus of the WSD was on the health service.
Social care was always seen as an aside. . . It was very,
very health focused, looking at mainly clinical and
medical outcomes. So, no, I think it was really biased
towards the NHS (social care professional).
This emphasis on telehealth was hard for sites where
social care staff led the programme, due to new reliance
on the involvement of general practitioners (GPs). This
problem was partly overcome in Kent when GP cham-
pions were placed within leading operational roles. These
clinicians had the power, influence and knowledge to en-
gage nursing teams and other GPs, they understood the
extra work involved and the need for randomisation, and
unlike many social care staff were not resistant to the
constraints the trial imposed. Cornwall had less prior ex-
perience of remote care than the other two sites, so came
into WSD with a relatively little telehealth and telecare
infrastructure. The relative lack of an existing remote care
system allowed them to use clinicians from the NHS Pri-
mary Care Trust (PCT) to lead the programme. The
process of staff engagement was easier in Cornwall due to
this decision. The PCT saw participation in WSD as an
exciting opportunity to develop new system-wide care
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improved chronic disease management. As the trial pro-
gressed, it became clear that clinical champions, placed at
strategic levels, helped sustain senior management inter-
est, deemed essential for moving forward.
I think having clinical champions as well as senior
clinical managers out there saying ‘I have had really
good success with this’ - I wouldn't want to lose
that. . .When you hear that positive feedback, and
we've made sure that’s all fed through to the PCT
Board, then it’s hard for the PCT to say no, we’re not
doing this (healthcare professional).
Organisational learning
For telehealth and telecare to stimulate ‘whole system
redesign’ and integration, organisational flexibility and
incremental, iterative learning was deemed essential by
local management teams. However, achieving this flexi-
bility was hindered by the requirements of the RCT.
Many new processes, such as patient assessment and
training, were set up according to the needs of the
RCT protocol, but as large scale implementation pro-
gressed, it became clear that these processes were
poorly aligned with the specific needs of the existing
local context, but could not be adapted. According to
one interviewee,
There was certainly a period where we were rather
locked into WSD being a discrete add-on service, as
opposed to being an integrated whole system approach.
That was influenced quite strongly by the need to not
distort the evaluation process. So, we carried on doing
some things that we knew were either expensive or just
under par (middle manager).
Unfortunately, as the programme progressed, the
requirements of the RCT meant that many processes
identified during implementation as locally sub-optimal,
could not be significantly deviated from. As one man-
ager put it,
I think it has . . . made me realise about the
limitations of RCTs. That whilst they are the gold
standard in evidence, to some extent they don’t allow
flexibility in terms of what you’d offer. Some of these
sites have been working for two or three years, and I
think . . . if left alone. . . they would be offering
something different now than they were when they
started, but we’ve restricted them from doing that
(policy advisor).
Staff reported they were able to learn about mistakes
in implementing remote care, but keeping within theRCT protocol often meant that they could not take re-
medial action to rectify them. Not being able to put
learning into practice was seen as detrimental to patient
care. This affected staff morale and the introduction
of change management strategies to support future
large scale implementation and sustainability, after
programme completion. In order to fit with local plans
for scaling-up remote care, many of the processes devel-
oped for the WSD are now being gradually replaced,
with the sites either developing new care models or
reverting back to old ones.
You have to unpick all the processes and procedures
we put in place to deliver the RCT because they’re not
good business processes. They’re too constrained so
we’ve had to take everybody in that mind-set out of
the programme environment (senior manager).
Despite the impact of the RCT on the sites’ ambitions
for mainstream implementation of remote care, its
robust nature was nevertheless seen as extremely timely
and pivotal to the future development of remote care
services, both in the UK and worldwide. Most partici-
pants perceived ‘useful’ evidence as being partly sub-
jective and context-specific, but they understood that
this was not enough to ‘sell’ telehealth and ensure a
long-term, widespread commitment to adoption. As
reported in other remote care work [5] the need to
gather systematically collected before-and-after data
was seen as a top priority, with clinician engagement
being greatly enhanced by the perceived robustness of
the RCT.
Moving forward
High levels of WSD staff turnover, and current uncer-
tain economic conditions have all impacted on the
sites’ future scalability plans. Time-limited funding
meant many staff were employed specifically for the
trial, but local spending plans meant that they had little
opportunity to stay in post once the RCT recruitment
was completed. In Newham this has been especially
problematic as nearly all staff were employed as tem-
porary ‘change management’ consultants. At the time of
this paper all but two of these had left the organisation.
According to one interviewee ‘they’ve lost all that infor-
mation and experience that they could have used and
applied and driven it forward’ (middle manager). More
broadly, managers felt there was an over-emphasis on
meeting RCT recruitment aims and research goals, at
the expense of trying to understand the implementation
levers and incentives that should be put in place to en-
sure that remote care made local business sense and
could be further scaled-up and sustained. At the end of
the RCT the sites were left starting from scratch in
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local needs.
The problem with the WSD programme was that . . . it
required us by virtue of the numbers game to install
telehealth in all sorts of people's homes. I think we now
need to focus its use in the right places. Now that will
mean taking some of the triallists off, and it will mean
adding new patients on, where we are in control of the
use of telehealth, rather than it being driven by the
needs of the evaluation process (senior manager).
Despite these setbacks, taking part in the programme
has provided the sites with new infrastructure, equip-
ment and resources. One of the programme achieve-
ments is that it has raised clinical awareness and trust in
telehealth services. Many staff, originally sceptical about
the efficacy of telehealth services, became enthused and
excited by the innovation as their knowledge and inter-
action with the programme increased.
I am one hundred and fifty percent committed and
believe that telehealth is the way forward and I will be
looking to work in a way that I can drive it forward
and make it happen. . . So, absolutely it has changed
me (healthcare professional).
Less positively, this increased enthusiasm may provide
a future source of tension if services developed in the
programme are not scaled-up or sustained once the
funding is removed. Concerns were raised that the tele-
health services provided under WSD put increased de-
mand on the local healthcare system, by serving to
highlight previously hidden unmet social and clinical
needs. The cost of meeting these unmet needs, in terms
of additional resources, was seen as a serious barrier to
scaling up.
But I think we've also learnt that quite a component of
telehealth has been picking up previously unmet need.
My guess is that a lot of the activity on WSD has . . .
made it better for people if they've been in touch with
health services. But quite honestly, some of that need
would not have been being met before (senior
manager).
Discussion
The Whole System Demonstrator was specifically
designed to provide more robust evidence of the effect-
iveness and cost-effectiveness of telehealth and telecare
in the management of patients with long-term health
conditions. In doing so, it was seen as a way of stimulat-
ing faster implementation of remote care. The RCT
element of the evaluation means that questions aboutbenefits evidence should in part be answered. However,
the other aim of the programme, with telehealth and tel-
ecare acting as a driver for new levels of integration, and
providing lessons for wide-scale future implementation,
was less successful.
The original WSD evaluation design attempted to
combine the need for better evidence, using an RCT,
with lessons about organisational change and strategic
decision making, to better inform decisions about scal-
ing up and embedding the technology into mainstream
services. The emerging results support the recent sug-
gestion for less of a focus on conducting RCTs in health,
that the quest for improved evidence does not necessar-
ily align with an RCT approach [5,6,8], with more re-
search needed which looks at ‘wicked’ [35] problems of
the implementation and appropriateness of telecare/
telehealth.
The components and constituent parts of the RCT did
not exist in isolation from local implementation needs,
and as the RCT was given priority these needs often be-
came eroded or skewed. As with any pragmatic evalu-
ation of this size, the final proposed design meant a
compromise between methodological rigour and realism.
A definitive RCT was required to produce the robust
data policy makers and commissioners have been calling
for. In contrast to other research designs that focus on
knowledge in action [19], in order to produce robust, re-
liable and universal evidence, the RCT had to be largely
implemented as originally planned and detached from
the complexities of the environment in which the orga-
nisations were embedded. We know that organisational
implementation and working practices are influenced by
a wide range of complex local, political and individual
processes [5,6,8]. Wide-scale rollout was not simply a
question of increasing user numbers within a given do-
main and time span, and requires significant degrees of
organisational learning about what works and what fails
to work. Unfortunately, the artificiality of randomisation
and associated levels of standardisation made a ‘learn,
reflect and adopt’ approach very difficult. The RCT
protocol was not well aligned with generating scalability
lessons, iterative and participative modes of learning,
and developing new levels of service integration. Action
was often not possible until the trial was complete. Con-
sequently, much of the iterative learning from the imple-
mentation process was not implemented.
Remote care technologies have often been positioned
as a ‘cure all’, in both helping address the western world’s
demographic time-bomb by filling gaps within the care
system, and as a vehicle for new levels of system integra-
tion [36,37]. The White Paper from which the WSD
programme originated states that it should ‘highlight the
many barriers to realising this vision.’ [1] The idea that
remote care implementation could lead to new levels of
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this aim would be achieved was left ambiguous. As
others have noted [38], while policy support may in-
crease an organisation’s capacity to adopt an innovation,
it will not change its strategic and cultural predispos-
ition. This WSD stands out in being the largest trial of
its type ever undertaken. Despite the resources deployed,
and a comprehensive and rigorous site selection process
of cases with past experience of telecare and telehealth,
we found that in actuality the sites were not ready to im-
plement this level of organisational change within the
timeframe given. It appears that despite a rigorous site
selection process, remote care was not a sufficiently
powerful driver to significantly reduce fragmentation
and discontinuities across the system, and push system
integration significantly forward. Nor did engaging in
the WSD programme create new levels of organisational
readiness as originally envisioned. Even in Cornwall,
where they started off with more flexibility, in that they
had less devolved and of remote care working, telecare
and telehealth did not lead to greater system integration.
People from different parts of the health and social care
system may have worked together more than previously,
but the underlying structure of the systems in place
remained largely unchanged [12]. What this study shows
is that telehealth and telecare was successfully imple-
mented locally without significant levels of system inte-
gration occurring and without the perceived need for
this to happen. If work from the programme is to be lo-
cally sustained, perhaps the original goals of integration
need to be redrawn in favour of more organic notions of
incremental scaling-up, that pay attention to the evolv-
ing needs of the service-in-context as it grows [19].
While it seems unlikely that care system redesign on any
significant scale could be implemented within the rela-
tively short two year time-frame of the WSD, like previ-
ous research [6,12], these results suggest that even
without the constraints imposed by the RCT, the ‘holy
grail’ of health and social care integration driven by re-
mote care, is still a very long way off. What is clear is
that during the WSD programme, the RCT protocol led
to implementation models that were not sufficiently sen-
sitised to local contextual differences. An important
lesson is that the development of a remote care service
cannot occur in a contextual vacuum treated as a pre-
wrapped generic implementation package to be adapted
later. Locally sensitive levers and incentives must be fac-
tored in and co-designed both from inception and along
the way.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that more resources to support im-
plementation and more evidence are not the whole an-
swer to scaling-up remote care. Gathering evidence fromlarge-scale RCTs, in parallel with implementation of re-
mote care services, creates confusion. It becomes diffi-
cult to determine how much change is a product of trial
processes, or directly attributable to changes in services
delivery, and whether any of the observed changes will
be sustainable [5,6,16]. In further investigating how re-
mote care can be mainstreamed, away from the con-
straints of an RCT, the Department of Health has
commissioned us to conduct parallel organisational re-
search across six additional UK sites with varying levels
of national and local government support, as well as re-
search on the technology supply side. We are currently
evaluating the findings. Early results suggest implement-
ing telehealth and telecare systems more incrementally,
at a pace that makes sense to the organisations of care
in relation to their locally changing needs and priorities,
is the best route to success.
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